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14 April 1958

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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14 APRIL 1958

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR continues to urge Iran to accept economic assistance.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Indonesia - Dissidents report Djakarta naval force off Padang beaches; Djakarta says two battalions have deserted from dissident forces.


Ghana - Pan-African Conference this week will not be "African summit talks."

III. THE WEST


British will urge Adenauer to overcome French objections to free trade area.

French rightists in reconvening Assembly will demand Gaillard take Tunisian border problem to UN Security Council.

Cuba - Rebels continue hit-and-run sabotage tactics.

**IV. ANNEX**

The Indonesian military situation - a consolidated study.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

14 April 1958

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

no USSR-Iran: Soviet Ambassador Pegov continues to press the Shah to accept "unconditional" Soviet economic assistance. The Shah will probably continue to refuse to accept major Soviet credits, but this will not affect the expansion of existing trade relations between the two countries. Survey work on joint development of three border rivers is to begin soon. Negotiations on a civil air agreement are still deadlocked. [redacted]

II. ASIA-AFRICA

no Indonesia: A 13 April report from Padang states that a government destroyer and four corvettes are standing off-shore, and that the dissident command expects them to shell the beaches prior to a landing by government forces. Indonesian army headquarters claims that two dissident battalions in the Padang area have defected, a development which would drastically reduce dissident strength. The pro-American army vice chief of staff, Colonel Jani, is concerned over the growing belief in the Indonesian Army that the United States is helping the dissidents. He is also worried about the fact that the expected delivery of bloc weapons may weaken the Indonesian Army's generally anti-Communist attitude. Army Chief of Staff Nasution--who is, in the opinion of Indonesian army officers, strongly anti-Communist--is achieving broad political and economic power as well as enhanced prestige from government military successes in Sumatra. He does not appear strong enough, however, to change President Sukarno's attitude toward the Communist party. [redacted] (Page 1)

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Mo - Pan-African conference: The 15 April Pan-African conference in Accra will not be the African "summit meeting" envisaged by Ghana's prime minister who sponsored the meeting. Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Morocco, the Sudan, and Tunisia will be represented by foreign ministers or lower-ranking officials. Only Liberia and Ghana will have heads of government in attendance. Tunisia and Morocco will undoubtedly try to focus attention on the Algerian question, but political issues may be generally subordinated to cultural and economic issues in view of the absence of leading area personalities. Soviet propaganda has already begun commenting favorably on the conference, stating that the meeting will play a great role in the African peoples' struggle against colonialism.

III. THE WEST

Mo Britain - free trade area: Macmillan apparently intends to press Adenauer very hard, during the Chancellor's 16-19 April visit to London, to exert German influence on France to accept the projected free trade area. Macmillan told the American ambassador on 11 April that abandonment of the free trade area project would exclude Britain from Europe and would lead to the complete withdrawal of British troops from Germany.

French tactics on Tunisian issue: Gaillard will be under strong pressure from some rightist elements for immediate reference of the Tunisian-Algerian border question to the UN Security Council when the National Assembly emergency debate begins on 15 April. Moderating counterpressure from the Socialists, next Sunday's cantonal elections, and general

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DAILY BRIEF

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fear of the possible political consequences of a long crisis now will probably deter his opponents from an all-out attack. Nevertheless, an early move to "apprise the Security Council" cannot be ruled out as a face-saving move, particularly in view of public complaints about "American pressure." [redacted] (Page 5)

yes
Cuba: The rebels, though posing no immediate threat to the Batista regime, are continuing their hit-and-run attacks in many localities, even outside Oriente Province. Despite some recriminations over last week's failure, they evidently hope to launch some further concerted action against the government. [redacted] (Page 6)

IV. ANNEX

no
Indonesian military situation: [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] (Pages 7-12 and Maps.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Situation in Indonesia

Army Chief of Staff General Nasution has achieved broad political and economic power as well as enhanced prestige as the result of government military successes in Sumatra, according to the American ambassador in Djakarta. Various sources confirm that all important decisions are made either by him or by President Sukarno. Despite Nasution's increased power, however, he does not appear sufficiently strong to challenge Sukarno on the issue of Indonesian Communism. An example is Sukarno's blocking of Nasution when he tried to remove the pro-Communist deputy town commander in Djakarta.

The American Embassy believes that after government forces occupy Padang and Bukittinggi, Nasution may favor negotiation with the dissidents in an effort to prevent long-drawn-out guerrilla warfare. There is some indication that President Sukarno may adopt the same attitude. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the military campaign alone cannot solve the dispute with the rebels and that a political approach should be adopted. [REDACTED] dissident guerrillas recently have appeared around Pakanbaru.

Col. Kawilarang, recently Indonesian military attaché in Washington, is undecided as to whether to accept the dissident offer to become commander in chief of all dissident forces. In North Celebes, dissident leader Lt. Col. Sumual directed an appeal in his order of the day for 13 April to the commanders of the revolutionary air force who were appointed on 9 April to "carry out your task as best as possible for the sake of the safety of our fatherland."

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Colonel Jani, vice chief of staff of the army, told the assistant US army attaché he was worried over the growing belief in the army that the United States is helping the dissidents. He was further concerned that the expected delivery of Soviet bloc weapons may weaken the army's generally anti-Communist attitude. Soviet Ambassador Zhukov allegedly has officially informed the Indonesian Government that the USSR will provide training for Indonesians in the USSR. The offer includes training in "practically any field desired," with initial emphasis on pilot training, aircraft and technical equipment maintenance, and various fields of maritime training.

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~~SECRET~~Independent African States to Confer in Accra This Week

Representatives of eight independent African states convening in Accra on 15 April will endeavor, by their manipulation of issues of broad and immediate concern to all Africans, to project a distinctively African "personality" onto the international scene. Complex cultural and political differences and conflicting policy objectives among the participating states--Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, the Sudan, and Tunisia--will, however, tend to inhibit agreement on joint action except in the less controversial spheres.

As all the conferees are committed to rapid political advancement for Africans, they can be expected to condemn European colonial policies and racial discrimination. The Algerian problem, included in the revised draft agenda at the behest of the North African states, is certain to come in for special attention.

Liberian President Tubman, if he attends as now expected, will be the only chief of state present, most of the other countries being represented by their foreign ministers. Although Ghanaian officials have insisted that no observers from dependent areas will participate officially, Algerian rebel representatives en route to Accra will apparently be attached to the Tunisian delegation. It seems probable that nationalist leaders from other nonindependent territories will likewise be on hand and in close touch with the official delegations. Observers for Sino-Soviet bloc countries may also be in Accra as news correspondents.

Moscow has already begun to publicize its favorable attitude toward the Accra meeting but will probably avoid any overt interference in the expectation that conference pronouncements will in themselves further the USSR's immediate policy aims in Africa. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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III. THE WEST

Britain to Press Adenauer Hard for Support on Free Trade Area Project

Prime Minister Macmillan indicated to Ambassador Whitney on 11 April his strong concern over the impasse in negotiations over the free trade area caused by French opposition. He said he proposed to tell Chancellor Adenauer during his 16-19 April visit to London that only Adenauer's influence with France can avoid a "Balkanization" of Europe which would force Britain to form a competitive economic unit of its own. Macmillan said he also will tell Adenauer that Britain would withdraw its four divisions from Germany "the minute it became clear that the free trade area was not to be basic in the new economic concept for Europe."

Britain has on various previous occasions sought US support for its concept of a comprehensive European trade agreement to be reached before the six-nation Common Market tariff reductions start coming into effect on 1 January 1959. France has held out for a slow and piecemeal approach, reserving the right to maintain special protection for certain sectors of French industry until after the effects of the first Common Market tariff cuts can be evaluated.

West German Economic Minister Erhard, who is accompanying the Chancellor to London, agrees with the British concept of a European free trade area, but Bonn has not yet supported it as strongly as London would like. Adenauer thus far has shown relatively little interest in the project, being apparently more concerned with improving relations with France in his efforts toward making Europe strong politically.

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~~SECRET~~Gaillard Still Under Pressure to Take Algerian Frontier Issue to UN

Despite the French cabinet's acceptance on 12 April of the US-UK good offices mission proposals as a basis for negotiations with Tunisia, Premier Gaillard is still under strong pressure from some elements of the right for immediate reference of the Algerian frontier question to the UN Security Council. The cabinet's decision is to be debated by the National Assembly, which was recalled from its Easter recess for an emergency session beginning 15 April, and there is no indication that the rightists' demands have lessened.

Gaillard may be able to ward off some of the rightists' pressure by moving to raise the French-Tunisian dispute in a special session of the North Atlantic Council. A French diplomat hinted on 11 April that such a move might be made very soon. While the Assembly's propensity for rallying to nationalistic positions would normally favor the rightists, a number of domestic considerations will act as a partial brake. The Socialist party is slowly evolving toward dissociation from tough policies regarding North Africa. All parties want to avoid a government crisis during the cantonal elections of 20 and 27 April, and there is widespread fear that a prolonged political stalemate might end in General De Gaulle's return to power.

Nevertheless, an early move by Gaillard to "apprise the Security Council" cannot be ruled out as a face-saving device, particularly in view of public complaints about the cabinet decision's having been taken under "considerable pressure from Washington." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~Cuban Rebel Activity Continues

The Cuban rebels, although unsuccessful in their first major attempt to call a general strike and incite a popular uprising, appear determined to continue their attacks against the Batista regime and may be preparing another large-scale effort. They have resumed their hit-and-run attacks in many localities, causing considerable destruction on 11 April at El Cobre, shrine of Cuba's patron saint, about 12 miles west of Santiago in Oriente Province. Other incidents have occurred throughout the island, and the US consul in Santiago reported on 12 April that the transportation situation remains uncertain.

Despite the charges [redacted] of inadequate support for last week's effort, exile groups in several Middle American countries have apparently been sending arms and men to the Castro rebels. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] There are other reports of a new rebel landing in Las Villas Province, where clashes between rebel and government troops have occurred in at least two towns. [redacted]

[redacted]

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IV. ANNEX

THE INDONESIAN MILITARY SITUATION
(As of 1600 hours, 13 April 1958)

The civil war in Indonesia appears to be nearing a climax. Government forces are at the point of launching final air, sea, and land attacks on dissident strongholds in Central Sumatra and are increasing their pressure on North Celebes. Dissident capability to resist these attacks is questionable because of the lack of manpower, the absence of any air or naval support, and doubtful morale. Their assets are relatively good leadership and the rugged areas they are defending.

The Ground Warfare

Regular Indonesian Army troops comprise about 200,000 officers and men, the quasi-military National Police Mobile Brigade, 20,000, and "rebel" volunteers another 10,000. The battalion is the highest tactical unit in the Indonesian Army. Battalions are assigned to one of twelve military district commands (see map #1) which may be subdivided into two or more regimental areas. The military district commands are directly responsible to the army chief of staff. Army headquarters is organized on the United States model of a few years ago and was designed primarily by two of the six Indonesian graduates of the US Army Command and Staff College.

The Indonesian Army invaded Central Sumatra between 7-12 March by air and sea and since then has overcome dissident resistance in the marshy eastern approaches to the dissident centers in the mountainous west coast area. The government has committed about 3,500 men thus far to this operation against dissident troops estimated at 4,500. At present, government forces are pushing toward the insurgent strongpoints of Padang and Bukittinggi from two directions. The attack from the north has reached a point about 70 miles from Bukittinggi and the movement from the east is at a similar distance from Padang. (see map #4) These columns have been slowed by stiffened dissident resistance in rough terrain but the government apparently plans to overwhelm resistance by an early air-sea attack from the west coast of

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Central Sumatra. It claims that two dissident battalions in the Padang area have now defected, thus drastically reducing dissident strength.

In North Sumatra, an uprising in mid-March by upwards of 1,000 government troops in sympathy with the dissidents took place in Medan. These forces were quickly dispersed, and the remnants have regrouped both northwest and south of Medan, including the Tapanuli area adjacent to Central Sumatra. They are alleged to have recruited additional men. Latest reports state that dissidents south of Medan plan to launch a counterattack northward, but government troops have begun to invade Tapanuli, probably en route to Central Sumatra. The military commander in Tapanuli has given the dissidents sanctuary and has refused to obey government orders but has not yet committed his forces to the dissident side. (see map #4)

In Celebes, the dissidents' control is largely confined to the long northern neck of the island where they have 5,000 troops. On 29 March, two battalions of government troops landed at the southern end of the neck and captured two towns. They were opposed by two dissident battalions, one of which defected. (see map #5) The government is now preparing to build up its forces in this area for a campaign to overcome dissident forces to the north. Balikpapan on Borneo has been designated as the forward military headquarters for operations against north Celebes until it can be shifted to that area.

The Indonesian Army is equipped with individual and light automatic weapons of varied origins and types, including Dutch, British, US, and Japanese. More than 80 percent of the weapons and 60 percent of the equipment is obsolete by US standards, and maintenance is poor but has proved generally adequate.

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Indonesian Air Force Operations

Combat aircraft in operational units of the Indonesian Air Force (AURI) total 12 F-51's and 13 B-25's. Transport aircraft total 30 C-47's and trainer aircraft 66 T-6's. Additionally, there are 8 DH-115 jet trainers and 18 miscellaneous types. A majority of training craft are believed nonoperational. Reconnaissance aircraft include 8 PBV-5A's and 15 light and liaison types. There are 59 miscellaneous aircraft among which are 6 helicopters.

Permanent home stations of operational squadrons are shown on map #2. In the conduct of missions in support of operations against the dissidents, however, mission aircraft have been temporarily deployed to other fields in Sumatra, Celebes, and Borneo.

The AURI has supported government military actions against the rebels with small-scale, sporadic bombing and strafing raids employing piston-engine light bombers and fighters. In some cases these attacks have been successful in breaking up concentrations of insurgent troops and vehicles and thereby assisting in the advance of central government ground forces. One achievement of air strikes has been the demoralization of dissident forces. AURI transport aircraft (supplemented by transports from the Indonesian civil air line) carried out two successful paratroop drops, the first in connection with the recapture of Pekanbaru in Central Sumatra on 12 March, and the second when paratroops were dropped in the Medan area in support of government operations to retake the city after the brief rebel uprising there. AURI transports also have been noted in some missions in support of ground forces, carrying both troops and supplies. AURI aircraft appear to have been used fairly extensively for reconnaissance missions.

What success has been achieved by AURI in support of government ground operations has been due largely to the absence of a rebel air defense capability. Even so, there are reports that one B-25 light bomber and two F-51 fighters have been damaged or destroyed by rebel fire. The government air effort is hampered by obsolete aircraft; shortage of spare parts; and low standards of leadership, tactical proficiency and maintenance.

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AURI representatives are included in the Indonesian arms purchasing mission which has been active in Eastern and Western Europe since early this year. It is quite obvious that some aircraft have been purchased, but the number and types have been the subject of a series of conflicting reports. The only figure now fairly firm is 11 IL-14 twin-engine transports, which were contracted for in Czechoslovakia, and which now are being prepared for a flight to Indonesia. The aircraft are to be flown across the USSR, China, Burma, and into Indonesia, [redacted]

[redacted] It also appears quite probable that MIG-type jet fighters and possibly some jet light bombers also have been purchased--probably from Czechoslovakia. [redacted]

[redacted] Delivery of aircraft is expected to begin this month.

At present, a number of Indonesian Air Force personnel, including at least 10 pilots, are apparently receiving flight and maintenance training in Czechoslovakia, and at least one course of instruction (nature unknown) is under way in Poland. Egypt also appears to be affording some training assistance to AURI.

Indonesian Navy Operations

Indonesian naval operations to date have necessarily been confined to mining, shore bombardment, troop ship convoy, and blockade of shipping. Reportedly the offshore approaches to Padang in Central Sumatra and Bitung in North Celebes have been mined. The Indonesian Navy has established a blockade over the harbors of Padang and Bitung that has been reasonably effective. However, small craft can probably operate with success, especially at night, in running the blockade. The only incident of note in the blockade operation has been the shelling and capture of the Danish freighter "Bretagne", as it attempted to leave Padang. The only shore bombardment reported has been a relatively ineffective effort against the harbor installation of Padang by the Indonesian destroyer Gadjah Mada and by a corvette.

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The Indonesian Navy in conjunction with the Merchant Marine has been able to deploy troops by water transport whenever the occasion demanded. The most notable achievement to date has been the landing at Palu in lower North Celebes where two battalions and an armored platoon were landed without opposition. The type of transport used is not known.

The Indonesian Navy's main base is at Surabaya, and normally most of the navy's ships are stationed there. Logistics, repair, and support facilities are located in Surabaya. Djakarta's port of Tandjung Priok is second in importance. Minor naval stations with 100-200 personnel and a few patrol craft assigned are located at Belawan (Medan), Sabang, Makassar, Tandjunguban (Riouw Archipelago), Amboina and Pontianak. (see map #2)

The Indonesian Navy has only the nucleus of an air arm and its pilots at present serve with the Air Force. The Navy does not have any aircraft as yet and no bases have been designated. Naval facilities at Surabaya include a seaplane station.

The Indonesian Navy has the following ships:

1	DD
4	PF (Patrol Escort)
2	PGM (Motor Gunboat) One of these is in reserve.
5	LSIL One or two not operational.
4	YTL (Small Harbor tugs)
14-16	MSI (Inshore Minesweeper)
29	YP (Patrol Craft) Several not operational.
2	AKL (Light Cargo ship)
1	AO (Oiler)

[redacted] the destroyer and the four PF's were standing offshore, and that the dissident command expects them to shell the beaches prior to an early landing by government troops.

The MSI's, YP's, 60 small craft of the Sea Police, 50 small craft of the Department of Shipping, and 25 small craft of the Customs Department are disposed throughout Indonesia, with concentrations in the Riouw Archipelago and the Makassar Strait and Molucca Sea areas.

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
In addition, four LST's are available for amphibious lift--one owned by the Indonesian Army and three owned by the government and converted for commercial shipping. The Marine Corps possesses 24 LVT(4)'s.

Total naval personnel, including marines, (Korps Commando - KKO), is 11,713. The Korps Commando with headquarters at Batudjadjar consists of 67 officers and 2,232 well equipped men. Relative to other Indonesian units, the KKO's combat proficiency, state of training, and morale is good to excellent.


The Indonesian Merchant Marine consists principally of small coastal freighters. At present, 122,000 tons (GRT) of shipping is government controlled. This total is made up of 87,000 tons government owned and 35,000 tons chartered. The 87,000 tons owned by the government includes 17,000 tons of shipping recently acquired from Soviet sources which will be operated by Soviet crews.

Two PCE's (Patrol Escorts) ordered from Italy are presently en route to Indonesia. Arrival is expected in early May. Two DC's (Coastal Destroyers) are on order.

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MAP 1
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






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MAP 5

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Operations Coordinating Board

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

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fear of the possible political consequences of a long crisis now will probably deter his opponents from an all-out attack. Nevertheless, an early move to "apprise the Security Council" cannot be ruled out as a face-saving move, particularly in view of public complaints about "American pressure." [] (Page 5)

Cuba: The rebels, though posing no immediate threat to the Batista regime, are continuing their hit-and-run attacks in many localities, even outside Oriente Province. Despite some recriminations over last week's failure, they evidently hope to launch some further concerted action against the government. [] (Page 6)

IV. ANNEX

Indonesian military situation: []

[] (Pages 7-12 and Maps.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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